From a Reader


A comment from a reader named ‘Jackal’. Extremely timely, relevant, and very important. Read and heed folks, it’s spot on.

And if you don’t know much about Rhodesia, pick up a few books on it; many parallels can be drawn between what happened then and what’s happening in America today.

Jackal… 1RLI Support Commando and ‘C’ Squadron SAS 1977-79

Study I consulted on…

The study of Fire Force Tactics employed during the Rhodesian War
(This article was published in the Marine Corps Gazette March 2000 issue)
By Major Jon Custis, USMC (now Colonel): Project Manager at the Marine Corps Programs Office, Naval Air Warfare Center-Training Systems Division.

This study provides valuable lessons for unit commanders and highlights the advantages inherent in an air-ground task force.
The reconnaissance team’s SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) report was concise: An estimated 15 guerrillas occupying a makeshift bivouac site 10 kilometers to the east of the village serving as the primary nongovernmental organization feeding site. Armed with new weapons and wearing fresh uniforms, the guerrillas appeared fatigued (due to the previous night’s forced march from the border) but in high spirits. The recon team first spotted the group as it moved along a stream bank then turned and disappeared into a stand of trees. Smoke from a cooking fire drifted into the heavy morning air, confirming their presence.
The heliborne company commander put the finishing touches on his operation order and made it to the confirmation brief at the prescribed time. His plan seemed simple enough; the company would land 4 kilometers away, and conduct a movement to contact to within 500 meters. Two rip platoons would envelop the position while the third platoon, machinegun, and mortar sections provided support by fire.
He finished his portion of the brief relatively unscathed, until the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) commander cleared his throat and asked, “Captain, what is your contingency should you get to your assault position, only to find that the guerrillas have moved on?”
This hypothetical scenario highlights the dilemma faced by every heliborne unit commander. Should he put his forces into action directly on the objective, or land them some distance away and rely on stealth and surprise? Each option has its own advantages and disadvantages, and the decision is made more difficult if the opposing force is highly mobile.
Landing on or very near an objective, en masse, does afford the unit commander more control if his unit moves into action immediately. Unfortunately, this practice could subject the unit and its assault support aircraft to hostile fire if shock and fire superiority are not achieved. The noise of the approaching helicopters would also provide warning of an impending attack, allowing the enemy unit time to flee.

Choosing a landing zone some distance away from the objective may mask the sound of the approaching force. The tactical situation, however, can change dramatically in the time required to complete a foot movement that ends with forces positioned to conduct the final assault.
Are heliborne unit commanders restricted to merely these two options? This article proposes that all infantry officers would benefit from a study of ‘Fire Force’ tactics employed during the Rhodesian War (1962-80). While the lessons to be learned do not merit a doctrinal change for all combat operations, they do illustrate the efficient use of limited resources and manpower against a particular type of enemy. Additionally, they provide the tactical foundation for a third option should vertical envelopment tactics be required against unconventional forces in a counterinsurgency environment.
Chimurenga-War of Liberation

The political history leading up to the Rhodesian War is too lengthy to detail in this article, but a brief background is in order. By the mid-1960s, Great Britain had decolonized much of Africa. The white minority of Rhodesia, led by Prime Minister Ian Smith, refused to concede to black majority rule. On 11 November 1965, Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence and broke away from Britain. In the face of this ‘rebellion’, the British Government succeeded in securing United Nations-imposed sanctions against the white minority regime.1
Initial guerrilla activity aimed at destabilizing the Smith government was low level and mostly ineffective until 1973. In that year, increasing numbers of insurgents from two Communist-supported factions began to infiltrate into Rhodesia from enclaves in Zambia and Mozambique. Initial actions centered around attacks on soft targets like white-owned farms. By 1974, insurgent forces had moved to a Maoist ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, consolidating positions in the rural peasant areas. Juxtaposed against the insurgent forces were the 12-month conscripts and regular volunteers of the army, air force, and police units. Some units, like the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) Regiment, were exclusively white. Others, like the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), were comprised of African troops led by white officers.

Deployed in January 1974, the Rhodesian Fire Force saw its first action on 24 February2. The techniques used to support vertical envelopment evolved over time, and this article details the most successful combination of techniques and assets used to take the fight to Rhodesia’s enemies.
Those enemies, lightly armed with Warsaw Pact small arms, generally operated in small groups of 6 to 12 individuals and attacked targets of opportunity or set ambushes. When engaged by Rhodesian forces, individuals of such groups would ‘bombshell’, scattering in all directions in an attempt to escape. They did so at an average rate of 300 meters per minute.
Fire forces were generally employed in response to three developments. The first would be a reaction to an actual ambush or farm attack. When trackers or cross-graining patrols followed up and made contact, a Fire Force was called in for reinforcement.3 Aerial reconnaissance also detected the presence of insurgents, resulting in a callout. Skilled pilots would recognize a series of radiating tracks, for example, from dense vegetation made by insurgents moving in and out of their concealed camp.4 The highest ratio of success was achieved when Fire Force action was initiated by a listening/observation post (LP/OP). These LP/OPs were established on hills affording observation over known infiltration routes and villages of known sympathizers. Anything out of the ordinary, such as lines of women carrying cooked food into groves of trees or dense bush, received further attention.5

An infantry company of the RAR or a commando of the RLI served as a Fire Force at a forward airfield for an average rotation of 6 weeks.6 By 1977, all of Rhodesia’s regular infantry were trained paratroops and could be deployed by helicopter, parachute, or brought in as reinforcements by ground vehicles. This proved to be a critical capability due to the fact that Rhodesia, for much of the war, was forced to use Douglas C-47 Dakotas of World War II vintage in order to get any unit the size of a squad or larger into action. The main workhorse of the Rhodesian Air Force was the Aerospatiale Alouette III helicopter, modified to carry four troops (referred to as a G-Car) or a 20MM reduced- recoil-cannon (the K-Car).
The Fire Force was, in essence, an air-ground task force. A 1979 Rhodesian Intelligence Corps study concluded that the most successful combination of aircraft was a K-Car, four G-Cars (each carrying four troopers), a Dakota (modified to carry 16 paratroops) and a Lynx (fixed-wing ground attack).7 Since the typical contact pitted a Fire Force against 6 to 12 insurgents, the force level of 32 troopers gave Fire Forces a 3:1 strength ratio on the ground.
The Role of the LP/OP

A typical Fire Force callout began with a sighting called in by an LP/OP. The Fire Force Commander took to the air in the K-Car, which also served as his mobile command post. ‘Sticks’ of four troopers, each stick equipped with a very high-frequency (VHF) radio and 7.62mm FN/MAG (our current M240G), followed suit in G-Cars. If the distance to the target required a refueling stop, the briefing would be held there. This allowed the LP/OP to provide an update on the target’s activity.8 Once airborne again, time was of the essence, and noise was the enemy. The sound of approaching helicopters often gave ample warning and allowed the guerrillas time to flee. Care was taken to approach the target area from downwind, as well as use terrain to mask the sound of arrival as much as possible. The Fire Force Commander also asked the LP/OP when the aircraft could be heard; this averaged about 4 minutes from the target.9 Assuming the insurgents could cover their usual 300 meters per minute, the commander made a time/distance calculation and adjusted his plan accordingly.

It was critical that the personnel manning the LP/OP had excellent map skills. The terrain in operational areas was generally savanna broken by cultivated farmland, low hills, and intermittent streams. The LP/OP was required to identify and brief to the Fire Force Commander all prominent terrain features and their relationship to likely avenues of escape (generally, thickly bushed riverbeds and ravines). Another critical element of information required was the compass heading from the LP/OP position to the target.
Upon arrival of the Fire Force, the LP/OP marked the target with a flare or tracer fire. The K-Car entered the target area first, flying in from behind and over the LP/OP on the briefed heading.10 Considering the orchestration required to manage all of his moving parts, the Fire Force Commander did not want to waste time finding the target during talk-on. Professor .R.T. Wood writes:
Ron Hint, a somewhat flustered territorial sergeant, of the Fifth Battalion, the Rhodesia Regiment, pointed his pencil flare projector and informed the incoming K-Car just behind him: “Marking target NOW!” The pencil flare refused to ignite. Coolly observing the sergeant’s agitated efforts, the K-Car pilot laconically commented from above: “Don’t worry. I can see where your finger is pointing.”11
Once certain of the target, the Fire Force Commander marked it with a smoke grenade or white smoke generator, and set his plan into motion.

Stop Groups and Sweep Lines
The K-Car pilot pulled the aircraft up and into a 60-knot orbit at 800 feet. He and the Fire Force Commander would select the kill zone into which the enemy could be driven, identified where the G-Cars would drop ‘stop groups,’ and planned dummy drops and the positioning of the paratroop drop zone. The goal was to take advantage of the shock from the initial air strike of the K-Car or fixed-wing aircraft. They would also select a rendezvous point for the helicopters to meet with vehicles of the reinforcing ‘land-tail.’
As the G-Cars arrived, the K-Car pilot directed them to prescribed ‘stop’ positions on the escape routes and orbited them individually. If the enemy was spotted, the four-man stick was deployed and then became a stop group. If the enemy proved elusive, the stick remained airborne and available for redeployment. The G-Cars remained in the area to reposition stop groups or evacuate casualties until it came time to refuel. This was accomplished back at an airfield, or at the rendezvous point where the land-tail had brought forward reinforcements, fuel, and ammunition.12 One G-Car remained aloft on the edge of the battle to accomplish any number of tasks. Perhaps the most important one was to act as a reserve command post if the K-Car had to transfer the Fire Force Commander and depart for fuel, or became damaged by ground fire.

Once the escape routes were sealed, the paratroops were flown in to sweep the area. They drove their quarry into the open to be dispatched by the high-explosive shells of the 20MM cannon aboard the K-Car, or into the ambushes set by the stop groups. If insurgents escaped the net closing around them, trackers were used to identify the direction of flight. The Fire Force Commander then leapfrogged stop groups ahead and placed them on the route to cut the guerrillas off.13
Command and control of every Fire Force action was made possible for a number of reasons. First, the Fire Force Commander remained aloft in the K-Car. This allowed him to develop the situational awareness required to keep stop groups and sweep lines from blundering into friendly kill zones. Secondly, the Fire Force Commander had VHF communication with all units through effective radios. If communication was lost, every effort was made to replace the radio with the spare kept in the K-Car, or unite that group with one that had a functioning radio. Finally, Fire Force troops observed very fundamental rules that often resulted in the loss of men when violated.

The first rule was to sweep downhill-never uphill. The second was to never sweep into the sun. The third was to always sweep from cover into open ground-never from open ground into cover.14
Such rigid rules may cause proponents of maneuver warfare and the ‘strategic corporal’ to bristle. It is evident however, that given the terrain, enemy, and friendly situations, they worked. An essential foundation of Fire Force tactics was the fact that the commander was not to expect independent action from units on the ground. Strict guidelines proved to be the best way to de-conflict fires in such a fluid situation.
Though history has shown that body counts can be misleading when used as indicators of success, a comparison may provide perspective. In just 9 months of Fire Force operations in 1979, RLI forces engaged and killed 1,690 insurgents. In all 9 years of the Malayan Emergency, British Special Air Service troops accounted for only 108 of their enemy.15

The Rhodesian Government eventually took the view that its military effort was doing little more than stemming the tide. A cease-fire was negotiated in December 1979, followed by all-party elections in March 1980. Robert Mugabe, head of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was elected to the presidency. Rhodesia’s name was subsequently changed to Zimbabwe.
The new Zimbabwe Army Commander and former guerilla leader, Rex Nhongo, admitted that Fire Force operations in the final war years had killed his junior leaders and trained men at a faster rate than he could replace them. ZANU’s military arm, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, would have been hard pressed to make it through the 1980 dry season because of Rhodesian Fire Force operations and cross-border incursions.16
Why do the Rhodesian War and Fire Force operations merit further study? As the Marine Corps experiments and prepares for the challenge of the ‘Three Block War,’ it must also keep in mind the fact that future opponents will very likely continue to strike at targets of opportunity. They will attack soft targets and seek to avoid direct engagement with the brunt of Marine ground combat assets until favorable conditions exist.

n any future counterinsurgency operations similar to the Rhodesian War, we can expect guerrilla forces to operate from enclaves in neighboring states. Kosovo and East Timor should come to mind immediately. These insurgent units can be intercepted, targeted, and attacked before they pose a threat to an urban area.
At the least, texts detailing Fire Force operations should be included in the professional military readings assigned at the Infantry Officer, Platoon Sergeant, and Squad Leader Courses. Tactics similar to those employed during Fire Force operations can be utilized, given that similar conditions exist. Again, this article is not an attempt to shift doctrine, but rather to add another tactical tool to an infantry unit commander’s tool chest. Even a single rifle platoon commander could disperse his force sufficiently and increase his odds of capturing or eliminating a small, mobile guerrilla force.
What Is Required?
A MEU composite squadron already provides the fixed- and rotary wing close air support and troop lift assets required to support similar tactics. The MEU itself possesses the full range of highly skilled reconnaissance and scout/sniper assets necessary to identify likely targets.

A reliable and truly effective squad/platoon VHF radio is perhaps the only materiel prerequisite currently unavailable. Without one, none of the communication required to move small, widely dispersed units in concert with each other is possible.
Serious thought needs to be given to what Marines take with them to the fight. Rhodesian troopers had to match the mobility of their quarry with similar mobility. They often dressed in camouflaged T-shirts, shorts, and running shoes, or light boots.17 They carried nothing else beyond the ammunition, water, grenades, medical kit, and rations required for the operation. Regulation denim uniforms would be worn, and light sleeping bags carried, only if they expected to establish an ambush in the vicinity of a contact.18
Unless the enemy situation truly dictates otherwise, ditch the flak jacket and helmet. “A Marine always wears his flak and helmet,” is a common refrain when planning an operation, and usually used as an excuse for ignoring a thorough analysis of the tactical situation. Does the cost (loss of protection afforded by the gear) truly outweigh the benefit of increased mobility and endurance?
The greatest paradigm shift required is a willingness to allow commanders to actually command an action from the air. All too often company commanders are forced to develop situational awareness solely through situation reports submitted by subordinate units. Fire force commanders could talk to, as well as see, their troops. Consequently, they were able to achieve the tempo necessary to outmaneuver and defeat an elusive enemy similar to the type Marines faced during Operation RESTORE HOPE. We would be remiss if we failed to study the modern conflict of the Rhodesian War and ignored the lessons learned.

Thanks again, Jackal.


I’ll add in a few things, to the readers, based on comments from the True Light Infantry post. First things first, I think a lot of folks missed the larger message. It was in part very much a critique of the current state of affairs in the US Infantry, but also a different viewpoint that seems to never get attention- the fact that most of you are not soldiers, and that groups of people who are not soldiers have been beating professional soldiers for a good while now.  Second, the nation of today will not be the nation of tomorrow. The regional political landscape ten years from now very well could look completely different, and new nations may very well form as a result of balkanization. That’s not for me to say, but it surely is in the realm of possibility. Regional armies will arise as a result, and many of the challenges the Rhodesians faced will also face the breakaway states. They performed admirably given limited resources and a world who turned their backs on them. Your job is to learn absolutely everything you can now and make yourself and those close to you the absolute best at whatever it is they have to offer. You can win, folks.

28 thoughts on “From a Reader

  1. Pingback: Brushbeater: You Can Win, Folks | Western Rifle Shooters Association

  2. I enjoyed the time I spent with him, especially when we talked about things he did in Rhodesia. I have two copies of that book, one is a loaner, the other one he signed so it’s a keeper.

  3. If patriots are every forced to adopt the role of G and evade Team Tyranny, I hope that the tyrant’s minions are not as competent as the units described above.

    1. I agree completely, but, I highly doubt that they could…it seems that they’re pushing out the true Warriors as we speak(and have been doing so for a while), and with the delusional inclusion of women into both the Infantry and all Special Missions Units, any individual or unit skill set will now be relegated to focusing on technology to get the job done.

      In short- I don’t see it working well.

      The Rhodesians are quite important for a couple of reasons- first, every Recon Unit in the US today shows a lasting influence from those experiences, and second, it’s a neat picture of what an Army that springs up from a Native-Skills population looks like. A lot of folks focus on the fight against growing tyranny now, but once victory has been attained(or regional Armies rise as a result of the splits), it’s important to know what a successful model should look like.

  4. For the US military to commit to, adopt, undertake, and evolve the Rhodesian style of counter insurgency into its organization is going to require a lot of true warriors with it in their hearts and minds to commit fratricide against their fellow Americans. A relatively large leap of faith and subsequent action is required of discarding it’s tendencies to place high priority on technology and futuristic equipment, and bring to fruition the tactics and strategy of small unit infantry counter insurgency doctrine enhanced with suitable technology that compliments small unit counter insurgency. Does that cadre exist? Can it be created out of the top down diversity centralized style of command and control evident in the current politisised command structure?
    A careful look at US military history from the invasion of Normandy in the 2nd world war on shows clearly it’s reliance upon metal and explosives to overcome it’s in general, lack of standardization and employment small unit infantry tactics and strategy beyond highly trained and specialized groups such as Special Forces and Navy Seals. The German Army proved to be man for man a far better maneuver small unit infantry army than the US in general, and only when met by the superbly trained cadre of specialized US troops such as Rangers and Airborne where the Germans defeated on small unit infantry tactics terms.
    Then there is the factor of centralized control by the political class, and its myriad of power brokers and special interests that is well to consider. Never mind it’s pyramid of administrative tyranny and its corrupt grip on the levers of industry and commodities from state level to the upper levels of federal influence and corruption. A serious factor both in terms of its behavior in retaining its power and wealth, but also it’s willingness to commit to and wage massive counter insurgency war across this geographically very large nation.
    I might add I believe it is a most pertinent consideration that the US, is no Rhodesia, or Chechnya, in regards to its land mass, population, cultural traditions, and its people. A factor which must be figured into the equation of balkanization or any form of armed resistance to centralized power that passes for government today and how it reacts to insurgency war.
    And all along the question of hearts and minds looms large. It can not be ignored in any fashion. The scope of hearts and minds will become an enormous and over riding factor above almost everything else. It will become a war within a war.

    I believe this government is its own worst enemy, it can not survive its own illegitimacy, never mind survive internecine war on its own soil. It has for who really knows how long waged war on indigenous peoples in far away and wholly foreign cultures, it has employed the use of massive amounts of materiel, waged clandestine proxy tactics and strategies, and has the advantage of economic tyrannical rule of fiat over most of the earth. All along the goals where not to fight and win wars, but to gain power, political power, power of resources, economic power. Fighting against American’s who have had enough, who are defending their homes, their families, their very way of life is an entirely different thing. People who are fighting to survive, not for political reasons or ideology, but for the inherent things that make us who we are, free people.
    In the larger scope, this government will not survive, those with their hands on the levers of power are going to need a Rhodesian Fire Force numbered in the tens of thousands. Where are they going to find the cadre to fill and replenish those ranks. Its so committed to diversity, green tree humping, lofting gays, lesbians and female combat cadre as the pinnacle of fighting prowess, and creating a cadre of political commissars, never mind the cultural purges within the officer and noncom ranks, it is about to loose all touch with the concepts of reality of fighting a war. How is going to pivot 180 degrees on its penchant for reliance upon metal and technology over boots and sound basic combat infantry tactics and the small unit leadership required to consistently accomplish that?
    These fools running things fuck up what kind of pistol the military chooses. And it takes 10 years. They can’t even keep 150 of the most effective and deadly close air ground support weapon ever devised, the A-10 Warthog. (Think what a few regiments of the 101st and all 150 warthogs could do carte blanch against Deash if left to fight across the Levant and provided unfettered resupply and autonomy to crush them?)

    When your a citizen infantryman, and all you got is your trusty AR15 or AK, the ammo and food you can carry on your back and vest, no air support, no resupply to be called in at a moments notice, just fighters like yourself and minimal support from the countryside, you better fucking believe you want to know how to fight like an Indian and win. Small unit infantry tactics for the guerrilla fighter is everything. It is the only way to fight. Can it beat the leviathan, sure it can. Look to what the Mujahideen in Afghanistan accomplished against the old Soviet. Then think about the resources and material, the cause of liberty and Christian Judaea culture here in America. Imagine how those resources could be turned to the G’s advantage.

    1. The books by Dennis Croukamp, Chris Cocks, COL Ron Reid-Daly, and the subsequent books by Al J. Venter about forces in Angola, the Congo, and Sierra Leone. Eben Barlow’s Executive Outcomes(if you can find it, it’s kinda rare) is excellent as well.

  5. Doug

    ncscout, you wrote about the Chechen’s and the cautionary insights of their being waylaid by islamists from outside. I can’t help but suspect somehow the Saudi’s, after decades of being involved in fomenting most of the terrorism in the western hemisphere, through there proxies, and I believe the blessing and help of actors within our own government are going to be a factor in the coming armed unpleasentries. By that I’m saying the importation of jihadi’s within our country is by design. They are going to be used as some form of stalking horse or proxy by those out to destroy America.
    Just what part they play is hard for a guy like me to say, but it isn’t rocket science the cultural marxist regime in power in washington isn’t importing these jahadi’s because they want to start a muslim knitting bee.
    Them Wahhabist’s are a pretty sneaky bunch. As Isis is basically their proxy army, it only makes strategic sense for so many political and economic reasons that would benefit the Saudi’s, King Salman and his defense minister Prince Salman get things going in the US. Since old King Fahd passed anybody notice the Caliphate took right off and Daesh suddenly appeared out of thin air? This kind of stuff is only possible with a ton of pre planning and pre positioning of resources. Like importing 100,000 “Syrian’s” into the US?
    How many “Syrian” jihadi’s would it take to do serious damage to a balkinised US?
    Or be a proxy insurgency for the human extinction movement running things”
    Or to create order out of chaos for the one world order psycopaths?
    And how as 4th Gen civillian small unit infantry freedom fighters do we apply the lessons of Rhodesia and Chechnya and the American Revolution and the War of Secession from the North into coherent winning doctrine?
    Enemies to the left of us…enemies to the right…enemies inside of us…how do we find the light?

    1. The caution of Chechnya was more in many directions, including not getting your movement co-opted by outsiders. In their case, it was indeed Jihadists, but any movement can get hijacked from the outside and “taken” from the folks who started it in the first place. When this happens, usually it begins to work contrary to the original goals, resulting in eventual failure.

      It happens a lot in politics. The Left does it all the time, and the useful idiots at the bottom usually are too stupid to realize what’s actually happening. But then, I’m a really cynical guy concerning “those types”.

      As far as the Salafists go(the larger Wahabbi movement) their end goal is complete submission of the world to Islam. Their brand, of course. We are being rotted from the inside, but as of this point in time, other than appealing to local government and being a vigilant citizen, little can be done. This will change.

      4GW is important to understand both as the guerilla and the local government, to attain both victory and security of said victory.

      The light lay in the path of God; doing what’s right morally. Never forget this.

  6. mtnforge

    Yes Sir indeed, as you say, “The light lay in the path of God; doing what’s right morally. Never forget this.”
    You know it.

    Those are all some mighty fine words you wrote above. The kind of ideas to live by and fight for.
    Thanks, sometimes you just have to hear the right ones.

    As much as the things changing is fraught with dire circumstances, sometimes I truly hope it happens sooner than later. These things are best taken care of before they fester and make those dire circumstances worse.
    Ten-4 on the vigilance. I’m doing all I can. And the guys like yourself out there help more than you may know. I hope too guys like me can reciprocate in kind.

    I’m really glad you put up your blog, I can tell you got a good mind and a good heart.
    Never quit, never say die.

  7. mtnforge

    “The light lay in the path of God; doing what’s right morally. Never forget this.

    Your right, never forget this.
    I think when your cold to the bone, and your aches in pains of your burden of rifle and kit weigh you down, when your far from home and hearth, and all seems forlorn and wearisome, when you ammo is low and you have miles of ridges and hollows to hump, and thoughts of loved ones seem so far away, and but there for the grace of the Lord I go and an appeal to heaven it is time to don the whole Armor of God.

    Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians 6:10-20
    6:10 Finally, be strong in the Lord and in the strength of his power.
    6:11 Put on the whole armor of God, so that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil.
    6:12 For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places.
    6:13 Therefore take up the whole armor of God, so that you may be able to withstand on that evil day, and having done everything, to stand firm.
    6:14 Stand therefore, and fasten the belt of truth around your waist, and put on the breastplate of righteousness.
    6:15 As shoes for your feet put on whatever will make you ready to proclaim the gospel of peace.
    6:16 With all of these, take the shield of faith, with which you will be able to quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one.
    6:17 Take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.
    6:18 Pray in the Spirit at all times in every prayer and supplication. To that end keep alert and always persevere in supplication for all the saints.
    6:19 Pray also for me, so that when I speak, a message may be given to me to make known with boldness the mystery of the gospel,
    6:20 for which I am an ambassador in chains. Pray that I may declare it boldly, as I must speak.

  8. mtnforge

    Yes Sir, reckon it takes more than bullets and beans to win. A bit of savings grace, and providence, the kind which sustains a man’s will and spirit.
    After all, this is really an ages old war that has never stopped, and in our context, we are picking up the crusade where our founders left off. We have a lot to learn and are gonna need all the help we can get.
    The sonofabitches are cunning this time around, trying to destroy our God given liberty, they are determined to exterminate men like us, our virtues and our freedoms. It is the only way they can defeat us, they think. I have this notion they underestimate what many of us are made of. If they didn’t, they would fear for their souls. There are those of us who are made of good and better things. Courage, faith, and indomitable will are things that reside quietly in the hearts of men till needed.
    But being mortal on this earthly coil, the whole armor of God is mighty sustaining ammunition and resupply so to speak. It is that shining light on the hill to me. It stands for something that in some ways only the deed can define. And it is the deed that counts.
    If your going to fight and win 4th gen war, you kind of have to wage it in a holistic manner to be successful. Its that hearts and minds thing. It begins within each of us.

  9. You know ncscout, yourself and a lot of guys like you who are studied accomplished light infantry combat warriors, your of a particular breed of warriors. Aside from you are ones who have certain selfless motivations and principles of a high order, who care and are acting and performing deeds, and deeds give you all a veracity which exceeds just words by orders of magnitude, you might like to understand something I’ve come to a conclusion on a theory I have regarding the mind of us citizen small unit g’s. Bear with me on this please, as I think it is something which might be beneficial to all concerned to grok as I think it speaks to many things. I could just be barking up the wrong tree, and I’m preaching to the choir, but it is like a splinter in my mind and I feel a need to share it with you, it least as a kind of process of gestalt on my part.
    The only way a free sovereign people can survive is for it to have within its culture a citizen militia. Not a standing army, or a law enforcement entity, (but maybe a justice of a peace constabulary or county sheriff system based of the original precinct idea of the compact of confederation). As essential to a culture of primal freedom and citizen sovereignty all the components of liberty are, from unfettered economy to faith, the one component which is both inextricably linked to all, but without which this one component none of the others are possible, is the citizen militiaman. Like why as in the origins of the 2nd amendment. (The history Of The second Amendment
    For all its human foibles, comprised of the body of the militia, men, it is the reluctant nature of a citizen militia which is its best and most honorable features, or qualities. And, at its best, is because of those features themselves. At its worst it is a just in time system of defense of ones life liberty and happiness. And there in lies the great conundrum, both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness.
    (That is not for a second meant as a detraction from the natural warriors among us, but in some important sense the two are complimentary and self regulating.)

    There is something in this below that speaks to elements of the above, I don’t remember who wrote it a few years ago, may have been the Mtn Guerrilla, John Mosby. I always greatly admired the truth and power of these words:


    The fundamental human right to self-defense and its tools does not stem from any piece of parchment or other act of man.

    It is much more elemental than that.

    I have more principled reasons for my stand on owning firearms, and I don’t care one whit in the world for the Second Amendment. It means nothing to me. My rights have nothing to do with the U.S. Constitution, and when it dawns on people that it has finally been erased — the principal danger of all political premises posed as “social contracts” — my rights will still validly exist, even if I die defending them. I own firearms because I have a right to private property. That is the First Thing.

    …As the Regime takes off the gloves, every day it creates tens of thousands more American Patriots who realize yes, it really probably is going to get that bad, so really, they may not have that much to lose after all.

    So why not stop being afraid and stand up to the Regime?

    Join the honorable Resistance, or make your own. Garden, cook at home, teach your children, and get right with the Lord. Cut expenses, avoid taxes, learn new skills, and build savings of tangible real assets. Train, stockpile, recruit, prepare, guard, protect, and defend.

    Make this your finest hour.


    and this guy…

    “…Recently, a faculty member at the National Defense University wrote to Marine Corps General Mattis, commander of I MAR DIV, to ask his views on the importance of reading military history. Mattis responded with an eloquent defense of taking time to read history, one that should go up on the wall at all of our military schools. “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation,” Mattis said. “It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead…”

    “…Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe. A good example is the advent of female suicide bombers; do U.S. troops now start frisking every Moslem woman they encounter? The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.

    General Mattis is correct that none of this is new. It is only new to state armed forces that were designed to fight other state armed forces. The fact that no state military has recently succeeded in defeating a non-state enemy reminds us that Clio has a sense of humor: history also teaches us that not all problems have solutions.”

    -from Understanding Fourth Generation War

    Like you said, history is a circular dynamic of humanity, of war in particular.
    But here is where some particular dynamics of war and the reasons of it diverge.
    Matis’s thinking is due in some part to his indoctrination as a product of his being a warrior of the state. Is he a citizen militia man, a 4th ten insurgent at heart, in context in this my missive to you? I don’t know, but his commentary and and thinking doesn’t indicate it. In a sense his perceptions, astute, insightful and accurate as they are leave out the imperatives and critical thinking of fighting for rightful liberty and freedom in the scope of 4th gen war. I think he, and others of his stripe are remiss in not taking this into account. After all, the state that he is a General officer of was born out of rightful liberty and a 4th gen war against tyranny of the state. I’m not trying to take a thing from this brilliant gentleman or question his veracity, only trying to make a point in order get to the crux of something I feel is necessary, critically, to understand. It is to my thinking and perception the same, “whistling past the graveyard” of essential truths of why, and their ideology not withstanding, the Afghan Mujahideen won against the state in Edward Westerman’s masterpiece The limits Of Soviet Airpower that Westerman pays limited lip service to, when in fact it is not the technological might or quantity of material that mattered, but the will to win, that decided the issue. There are more caveats than you can shake a stick at here of course. And I’m just a reluctant partisan at best, not ant military mind. But I do know you never give up no matter what.
    Is it all come down to fighting for something verses fighting because of something? Is that what 4th gen war is?
    Why really was 3% of the population of colonial America and it’s frontier able to win against the greatest tyrannical empire in human history?
    There is something essential here that has to be made into common reference, simple, austere even. Something in the vernacular and context of here and now.
    Why we who are freemen, who will never bend a knee to the sonofabitches, who will never give up, who by living or dying, will always be free. Indomitable?

    “Of course, there is a risk, but only from a tyrannical and oppressive government bent on the absolute destruction of a free society.” -TL Davis

    1. I truly appreciate the very kind words brother. I agree with all of our points, and I’ll state that the war is a constant clash of culture. There’s no way around this. One thing that resonated was the bit about frisking Muslim women…if they cannot or will not accommodate to Western values, then they, by definition, have zero interest in being a productive citizen. A lot of the “leftist libertarian” mindset has a lot of trouble with this; but the fact remains painfully clear- a society is defined by culture, which at it’s core must be clearly defined and zealously guarded. There is no proverbial “melting pot” so to speak- it’s a progressivist myth. The protection of said culture comes from within- the local armed force all bound together by that same central idea. The bottom line is that when two fight, one fights to protect it’s identity, and the other to simply subdue, eventually the identity grows stronger after a time underground. A free society is only free on it’s own terms and when everyone voluntarily accepts its norms.

  10. mtnforge

    That muslim woman who isn’t to be frisked is a proxy symbol for all cultural marxists.
    They are preparing an asymmetric battle field so they hope their strategy not to be culturally frisked for the destruction of a free society if just effective enough to keep those they wish to liquidate off balance. It is akin to getting inside the OODA loop of culture they despise.
    But isn’t 4th gen war in all its aspects a double edged sword. Kind of like tracers how they work both ways?

  11. mtnforge

    When I read this below I always wondered if this position paper evolved into present counterinsurgency doctrine itself or represented actual established doctrine of the time and evolved accordingly.
    Somebody had to be very concerned about 4th gen to sanction a paper like this.
    It’s some serious shit right there. Enough to take it seriously and try to understand how present day thinking and planning takes it into account.
    Pine Nation? Fusion Centers? Jade Helm? Free .mil field gear and weapons gear for police depts? 5th column efforts at psychological warfare regarding guns, media’s emasculation of American men etc.

    In 1994 the Pentagon’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence, a Major Ralph Peters, wrote a position paper, Warrior Class:

    The desire for patriotism is considered an enemy doctrine. The U.S. armed forces must be prepared to fight against all those who oppose the New World Order and who are holding out for nationalism… This new warrior class is most dangerous because they consist of those who fight out of strong religious beliefs… There is a worldwide class of patriots (i.e., “terrorists”) who number in the millions, and if the current trend continues, there may be more of these who…love freedom and are the target of the New World Order… You cannot bargain and compromise with these warriors… We, as the military, need to commit more training to counter these warrior threats. We must have an active campaign to win over the populace. This must be coupled with irresistible violence.
    – from the McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, May/June 1994

    “Number in the millions”
    “You can not bargain and compromise with these warriors”

    Sincerely, that just warms my heart like nothing else could.

      1. The guy had a fertile mind and delightful ingenuity. As you read his reasoning his critical thinking makes you shift into mental overdrive as he connects so many things together and turns it into a higher plane viable way of fighting.
        You can see why small unit German Infantry in WWII where so effective in some of their tactical methods against the Allies.
        Do you think any of Boyd’s concepts sank into the counterinsurgency community outside of non doctrinaire thinking of say like SF’s?

      2. SF has its own doctrine as well. All SOF units have a METL and their own niche, many times overlapping into several areas for flexibility purposes.

        As far as the German tactics of WWI are concerned, much of that was retained and developed into Darby’s Ranger doctrine. The concept of the OODA loop is taught in many circles, Infantry and otherwise, most notably with Fighter Pilots.

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